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Representation and the Pedagogical Reduction of the World 
 
Introduction 
To make the world present, one needs representations. Acknowledging that the self and world is mediated 
by way of representations, as Paul Ricoeur put it ³WKURXJKVLJQV V\PEROV DQG WH[WV´1 opens up many 
considerations for philosophers and, as I hope to show, even more significantly for those interested in 
education. 5LFRHXU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQKHUHLVVLJQLILFDQWVLQFHalong with Heidegger and Gadamer, his work 
is characterised as philosophical hermeneutics, a philosophical tradition whose implications for education 
are hitherto somewhat unrecognised.2 The relevance of this tradition can be found in the articulation of 
the interpretive condition of human being, and therefore, an account of education which understands the 
reduction, interpretation, and representation of the world to the young becomes possible. In short, 
education is essentially hermeneutical. In what follows I explore questions around pedagogical 
representation and their relations to the general problems of representation by way of two important 
pedagogical texts: &RPHQLXV¶Orbis Sensualium Pictus, and the Zen Buddhist training text, The Ten Bulls. 
 
The Philosophical Need for Representation 
Discussions of the nature of representations, signs, symbols, and other related concepts preoccupy modern 
philosophers. These discussions generally concern relations between what might be called the visible and 
invisible. Explanation, signification, and representation entail a correlation between something absent (or 
invisible) and something present (or visible). It is noteworthy that educational theory tends to gloss over 
fundamental questions of representation, especially given the fact that representation could arguably be 
the central pedagogical concept; it may be the key pedagogical insight to apply to wider philosophy.3 By 
educational representation I mean that education is not just the haphazard presentation of the world to the 
young, but could be said to be the intentional representation of aspects of the world, albeit, interpreted and 
reduced to make for structured learning possibilities. The definition of education as entailing intentional 
pedagogical reductions of the phenomenal lifeworld will need some unpacking, as will its implications. 
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First we may ask why we should need representations to refer us to any thing? In one sense the 
simple presence of an object might be enough. I do not need a picture of my mother when we are 
together. When she is absent her representation hanging on the wall acts to make her presence felt. In an 
age of tele-presence (e.g. Skype; Facetime etc.) and other technological mediations, general assumptions 
around presence and absence can be less taken for granted, and we are right to wonder what presence 
even means. The presence of less concrete beings, like music, beauty, or justice, require mediation in a 
richer sense, through what Shakespeare in $ 0LGVXPPHU 1LJKW¶V 'UHDP has Theseus call ³local 
habitation and a name.´ The manifestation of the universal idea through particular concrete objects is 
supposed, through the Neoplatonic lens of Shakespeare, to open a window to being itself.4 This suggests 
that the representation of the thing makes it visible, and that this is µmaking present¶ as poiesis. The focus 
of learning should, from this point of view, be the universal since an apprehension of this would unlock a 
knowledge of (if not familiarity with) all. As we will see, the universal intention behind textbooks like 
&RPHQLXV¶ Orbis Sensualius Pictus suggests such a universalist orientation. These ideas indicate that 
pedagogical representations are less about simply making present what is absent, than about inducting 
children into universal knowledge by way of the symbolic lifeworld through mathematical number, 
textual signs and metaphysical ideas. Indeed, as Heidegger points out, µPDWKHPDWD¶ originally refers to 
that which it teachable, and is, then, the substance of all education. 2Q WKDW EDVLV 3ODWR¶V DFDGHP\
requires a commitment to geometry, to symbols and representations.5 These reflections on the 
philosophical place of representation in education introduce, and lend some support, to Klaus 
0ROOHQKDXHU¶VNH\GLVWLQFWLRQLQForgotten Connections between presentation and representation.6 
 
The Role of Representation to Education 
Representations are pedagogically essential. As Mollenhauer SXW LW ³>Z@e long ago accepted that the 
UHDOPRIVFKRROLQJFRQVLVWVRIDKXJHPRQWDJHRI LPDJHVDQGUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVZKLFKDUHQRW³WKHWKLQJV
WKHPVHOYHV´EXWWKDWLQVWHDG³SRLQWRXW´WKLQJVDQGSKHQRPHQD.´7 For Mollenhauer this pointing out on its 
own is not quite enough. Representation does not just fully and comprehensively reflect what it represents 
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for obvious reasons. Therefore, the need for representation in education arises out of its ability to structure 
and frame a world too vast and confusing in itself. The emergence of explicitly pedagogical 
representations of the world through the textbook around the time of Comenius reflects a fundamental 
VKLIWZLWKLQRXUHGXFDWLRQDOKLVWRU\0ROOHQKDXHU¶VQDUUDWLYHGLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQ the presentation of the 
world to the child, where pedagogy is more direct and related to the immediacies of upbringing, prior to 
the more consistent construction of childhood as a stage of development on the way to full humanity. This 
allows Mollenhauer to make a systematic distinction between the immediacy and not always intentional 
dimensions of upbringing as presentation, and the more intentional but also more mediated forms of 
representation in school0ROOHQKDXHUUHIHUVWR&RPHQLXV¶Orbis Sensualium Pictus (generally translated 
as The Visible World in Pictures, though this translation raises a few problems8) as an example of the 
emergence of the realm of pedagogical representation.  
Any representation involves some kind of framing of the world that draws attention to certain 
features of interest or significance, while obscuring others (of less interest, or simply too complex at this 
pedagogical stage or moment). This is because representations do not just make close/present what is 
distant/absent. Nor do representations only refer directly to something else (e.g. the map does not only 
refer directly to the territory which it maps). On modern digital maps the aspects of significance or 
meaning are layered by smart use of imaging technologies (e.g. terrain, transport, traffic and so on). These 
aspects of representation reveal some characteristic reductions that representations generally involve. The 
user of the digital map can make choices about which layers of information to include or exclude, but the 
structure of mapping itself, and the layers available to the user are not in his or her control. There is, then, 
the reduction made by the user, and in addition, a set of reductions also imposed on the user by the form 
of the technical interface which, by foregrounding certain functions, conceals that which the designers 
deem to be distracting or problematic. We might say, then, that digital interfaces perform a technical 
reduction: the world is mediated to the user through technical objects that reflect the (anticipated) desires 
of the user.  
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Educational representations involve a pedagogical reduction: such a reduction might entail a 
simplification of certain aspects of the world, or of a complex set of actions or understandings in order to 
develop skills and knowledge in an intended and organised way. Textbooks offer clear examples of 
pedagogical reductions. The complex and contested nature of any domain of knowledge is secondary to 
the clear and simplified account of that domain. Official knowledge is inevitably framed, structured, and 
reduced to facilitate learning, particularly in the context of compulsory mass education. The official 
textbook knowledge is often regarded as providing only an entry point into a domain, since the 
simplifications and generalisations must be contextualised and complicated at some point. This could be 
regarded dialectically: that knowledge must be established through a rudimentary thesis, which then must 
be called into question, and refined into a synthesis that becomes a new thesis to be called into question. 
In addition to the pedagogical reduction that allows for the dialectical process to begin, representations 
also facilitate what can be termed pedagogical rehearsals. These refer to the spaces of education which 
offer students the opportunity to rehearse complex actions and knowledges before they are performed for 
real. It is important to note that rehearsal and reduction, are central features of education, rather than 
inauthentic distractions to be avoided or apologised for. Recognising the positive role of reduction and 
rehearsal is vital because it has become fashionable among progressive educators in particular, at least 
since Dewey, to claim that education should strive for authentic experience of the world, and that the 
educational space should be, as far as possible, continuous with, or indistinguishable from, the so-called 
real world. Pedagogical reductions and rehearsals appear to some as dimensions of inauthenticity. From 
this perspective, learning should aspire to EH µUHDOZRUOG¶UDWKHU WKDQDEVWUDFWRU UHKHDUVHG Contrary to 
WKLVGHVLUHIRUµDXWKHQWLFLW\¶,suggest that education should be taken as intrinsLFDOO\µLQDXWKHQWLF¶WKDWWKH
pedagogical reduction is not to be avoided, but to be recognised as key.  
It is essential to the representational reduction that, in selecting what is of interest, it determines 
on behalf of the student, what is worthy of attention and interest. Much as progressive educators might 
seek to disavow the authority of the teacher in determining the orientation of the student in this way, or 
critical pedagogues might draw attention to the hegemonic nature of this selection process,9 this 
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dimension of pedagogical reduction seems to be hard to avoid, and indeed, something that the student 
hopes for, if not quite demands of the teacher. It is a significant service to the student that the pedagogical 
reduction of the world takes place so that an entry point to education is possible. So it is clear that this 
reduction is intended to make some aspect of the world available to the student, despite the fact that 




A world of appearances like that revealed in the movie The Matrix or by 3ODWR¶s Allegory of the Cave 
might be a comfortable place. However, philosophers have long had an ambivalent relation to the idea of 
an appearance as contrasted with a real world, leading to various images of demystification of education 
IURPWKHDVFHQWRIWKHPLQGLQ3ODWR¶V&DYHWRWKHDEVXUGO\RYHUGUDPDWLFILJKWVFHQHLQ-RKQ&DUSHQWHU¶V
film They Live, where the protagonist goes to great lengths to have his friend share his experience of 
demystification by putting on glasses which reveal the truth, while the friend resists every effort to have 
the glasses forced over his vision. Critical pedagogy, as a progressive educational movement has a more 
direct concern with demystifying the socio-political interests and hegemonies that govern the pedagogical 
reduction. It is perhaps simpler to rail against those authorities governing pedagogical reductions in 
general, than to offer a rationale for different choices concerning a necessary reduction. It is too easy to 
interpret critical pedagogy as lifting the veil, or revealing the truth, without recognising that this always 
entails a different reduction: as Heidegger put it, that every revealing is also a concealing.10 This is to 
recognise our hermeneutic condition: that interpretation, reduction and education belong together. The 
danger is that critical pedagogy would seek to do away with the pedagogical reduction itself by failing to 
recognise the constructive mode that reduction entails. This suspicion of representation seems predicated 
on too simplistic a binary between appearances and the real. The ambivalence towards representation 
goes back at least WR3ODWR¶VEDQQLQJRIWKHSRHWVLQThe Republic.  
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Poets are problematic firstly because they imitate aspects of the world, and secondly because they 
rely on rhetoric to do so. ,Q WHQVLRQ ZLWK WKLV DFFRXQW RI PLPHVLV LV 3ODWR¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW the mind 
ascends from the world of senses to mathemata. Mathemata might be understood here as being that which 
is intrinsically teachable because it already exists in the soul and requires remembrance (anamnesis). The 
process of remembrance, of learning what we already µknow¶, presupposes the ontology outlined earlier, 
in which the learner recalls universals by way of encounter with concrete objects; learning as recollection 
and ascent. One subsequent question occurs: are representations of objects mimetic or mathematical? Do 
representations imitate imitations (as Plato suggests of the poets in Book X), or do they make universals 
accessible through recollection. In a different register, but with related concerns, we might ask with 
Heidegger whether UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVFKDOOHQJHIRUWKWKHZRUOGLQWHUPVRIWKHSURMHFWLQJVXEMHFW¶Vdesire to 
control, or do they bring forth (poiesis) the world which the subject can participate in.11 Heidegger makes 
many enigmatic allusions to this key distinction between representational thinking and real thinking. For 
Heidegger, the problem with representational thinking is not that human beings use representations to 
mediate the world around them, but that the representations are regarded as sufficient unto themselves 
referring to nothing beyond themselves. Without a recognition of the limitations of representation, 
knowledge can become fragmented and parochial, rather than universal. But how are we to acquaint 
ourselves and our children with the universal? &RPHQLXV¶WH[Woffers the pedagogical reduction that makes 
everything present to the child. 
 
The (In)Visible World in Pictures 
First published in 1657, and being one of the first pedagogical works for young children, &RPHQLXV¶ 
Orbis Sensualium Pictus is a curious text when it comes to the question of representation, for, despite its 
title (usually translated The Visible World in Pictures), it seems concerned with both the invisible as well 
as the visible (sensualium). It might be anachronistic to expect the visible world to mean today what it 
meant in 1657, but does not the text weave between the visible and invisible as Charles McNamara 
suggests?12 The structure of the book reflects the organisation of the late medieval cosmos. After a brief 
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exhortation of wisdom, the text addresses the reader to very concrete and visible matters. Beginning with 
what might be read DVDQHDUO\YHUVLRQRIµ2OG0DFGRQDOG+DGD)DUP¶GUDZLQJVRIGLIIHUHQWDQLPDOVDUH
presented along with their names and characteristic animal sounds (though requiring some imaginative 
translation: the dog grinneth, err; the serpent hisseth, si; etc.). This representation of the alphabet through 
the concretely visible is immediately followed by an analysis of God in himself (Blessed, everlasting, 
VSLULWXDODQGVRRQ0F1DPDUDVD\VWKDWWKH2UELV³DEUXSWO\VKLIWVWRWKHSKLORVRSKLFDODQGWKHLQYLVLEOH
peUKDSVKRSLQJWKDWDILUPJUDVSRIGXFNVDQGPLFHLVVXIILFLHQWIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHGLYLQH´13 It could 
be asked whether God, heaven and the soul might have been aspects of a µvisible world¶ to the mid-
seventeenth century child (or to Comenius), for whom the secular age is some way off. The text moves on 
to creation (heaven and earth) followed by the elements (fire, water, air, earth), and through a great list of 
objects, organised along the lines of the great chain of being in which everything has its place within the 
cosmos.14 This systematic representation of the world can be regarded as complete, as offering the child 
access both to the symbolic order of literacy, as well as to the universals that encompass everything. In 
order for everything to be present through a pedagogical reduction, the text mediates universals that are 
its real object.  
 
The Unrepresentable 
So far, this paper has recounted the view that education entails representation utilising reduction to 
represent the visible world to the child. These ideas are in tension with the category of the 
unrepresentable. The novel contribution of this paper is to expose the tensions between the pedagogical 
reduction of the world and the category of the unrepresentable. It is an open question as to whether 
unrepresentable things exist or what is meant by the claim that something is unrepresentable. At the level 
of logic, anything thinkable can be represented. Nevertheless, it is common to see the ultimate reference 
point of religion (God/truth/enlightenment) as that which resists, subverts, or denies attempts at 
representation. The logic of my argument boils down to this: if 1.) education is essentially about 
representation, and if 2.) there is something in the world which is intrinsically unrepresentable, then are 
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we forced to admit that education has no place when it comes to the unrepresentable (e.g. the referent of 
religion)? Does this suggest that the unrepresentable referent of religion cannot be the object of learning 
within education? Or should we question the idea that education requires the pedagogical reduction? 
When we consider &RPHQLXV¶WH[WZHPXVWUHDOLVHWKDWWKHOLQHEHWZHHQWKHYLVLEOHDQGLQYLVLEOH
is not one that can be drawn by some kind of natural intuition or common sense. Perhaps reference to the 
term sensualium (sensual) suggests that the key distinction should be between that which can be 
represented to the senses, and that which cannot. Of course, translation of the text as The Visible World in 
Pictures is problematic, but I think something more can be said about these terms. John Milbank argues 
that to see the beautiful is to see the invisible in the visible. He claims that ³[i]n the High Middle Ages, 
the possibility and experience of seeing the invisible in the visible, or of seeing the invisible as 
LQYLVLEOH«ZDVJHQHUDOO\DVVXPHGDQGSHUYDGHGOLIHDUWDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´15 The invisible framed the 
visible and, in a sense, made it possible, made it visible. The point of this reference is to draw attention to 
a dialectic between the visible and invisible, or between the representable and the unrepresentable: that 
they are relational, rather than absolute, terms. 
God/truth/enlightenment is simultaneously unrepresentable and representable, simultaneously 
invisible and visible. This is because the visibility or representability of a thing is not a property of it as 
such, but is a relational property existing between the beholder and beheld.  The act of making particular 
(visible) that which is universal (invisible) always entails a reduction that both reveals and conceals, and 
so is a process or relation that is never complete. This suggests that our human condition is betwixt and 
between, in motion among the visible and the invisible. But the phenomena of the visible world make the 
invisible visible. Again referring to Shakespeare¶V7KHVHXV, we, like poets: 
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven; 
And as imagination bodies forth 
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen 
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing 
A local habitation and a name.16 
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There is another way of approaching for this relational understanding of visibility/invisibility: the 
problem of idolatry. To idolise generally means to love a thing excessively. Theologians sometimes take 
this concept to refer to the idea that objects are mistaken for God, or that representations or symbols are 
taken literally. Typically, idolatry is said to occur when representations of God are affirmed in and for 
themselves, sufficient to themselves, or taken to be God as such (e.g. the Golden Calf story in Exodus). In 
these cases, the visible no longer bears the invisible, but is sufficient to itself. We are no longer able to 
³VHHD:RUOGLQD*UDLQRI6DQG´17 The object of reverence is taken to be an idol, and so the faithful are 
exhorted to remove all idols from sanctified spaces. But, of course, not all idols are removed and religious 
histories have complex phases of iconography, iconoclasm, reform, and so on, much of which concerns 
the relations believers have with their representations. Idolatry, then, is a relational issue. Peter Rollins 
has argued that idolatry is fundamentally a question of relation, pointing out that idols are not profane 
REMHFWV WKDW ZH PLVWDNH IRU GLYLQLWLHV RU IHWLVKL]H DV KDYLQJ LQILQLWH GHSWK EXW DUH ³LQ WKH H\H RI WKH
beholder,´18 occurring through a problematic orientation or relation with ideas and objects. As verb or 
adjective, idolizing is effectively a practice or a state in which we orient ourselves to objects in ways that 
foreclose the invisible ground of the visible. 
 
The Ten Bulls 
I now turn to a text from Zen Buddhism to explore an alternative perspective on the questions of 
pedagogical representation and reduction. Notoriously difficult to systematise and rationalise, Zen 
Buddhism provides a strong contrast to the approach of Comenius and yet, the basic journey described by 
the Ten Bulls can be neatly summarised: 
Way out of suffering = eradication of afflicting passions = transformation of the energy that flares 
in the passions into Buddha-Nature = gentling the bull = becoming human = the realisation of the 
No-I = the end of all fear = insight into the nature of change = deliverance = insight into the way 
all things really are = the end of suffering = awakening.19 
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Is this way an education as formation? This question might leave us with a conceptual 
understanding of the Ten Bulls, but to go beyond the conceptual requires a particular pedagogical 
intervention which the text makes possible. The set of ten poems, pictures, and commentaries that forms 
the text, uses the different relations between a bull and a herder that arise during a process of taming or 
gentling the bull, relations which describe the various stages towards enlightenment. Although not 
regarded as a pedagogical textbook in the sense that Orbis is, it is intended to act as a pedagogical device, 
offering a tool for, and representation of, stages of spiritual practice. But since Zen Buddhism is 
particularly subversive when it comes to representations of the path to enlightenment, the approaches the 
text takes are more allegorical and metaphorical. 
Many versions of the bull-taming pictures have been identified, ranging from 5 to 11 images. The 
most well-known version (which is today kept in the Shokokuji Temple, Kyoto) is that produced around 
1450 by Shubun, a 15th century Zen Monk and one of the most celebrated painters of the Ashikaga 
period.20 Shubun is thought to have copied the pictures from Kakuan, a 12th Century Chinese Zen master. 
The images have long been a favourite training analogy for Zen Buddhist monks and are still used today. 
Each image is traditionally accompanied by three sets of poems, that address the Zen monks but also 
acquaint other interested readers with the fundamentals of Zen training.21  
A brief sketch of the content is necessary. The fiUVW LPDJH LV FDOOHG µ,Q 6HDUFK RI WKH %XOO¶ ,W
shows the herder looking lost, revealing the human condition as one of being in question, at odds with self 
and world, where the bull cannot be found. The second and third images show the stages of the herder 
discovering WKH EXOO¶V hoofprints and a brief perception of the bull itself. Stages four to six show the 
herder catching, taming, and riding the bull. This is followed by transcending the bull in the seventh 
image and the transcending the self and bull in the eighth. Following transcendence, the ninth image is 
called µreaching the source,¶ and in the tenth, the herder returns to the world. 
To say that the bull and herder represent different aspects of the self might be misleading, since 
the text must be practiced: read, meditated upon, and experienced. Buddhist teaching recognises that the 
truth of enlightenment is not something to be told directly. So, on the one hand it is hard to say that the 
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text represents anything: rather it invites the practitioner into an approach or practice. Does this mean that 
the text does not perform a pedagogical reduction or entail representations? Clearly, the images and texts 
are, in some sense representations. As a pedagogical device the text presents something metaphorically or 
allegorically. On the face of it, this would seem simply like a representation. But unlike the numbered 
LPDJHVLQ&RPHQLXV¶WH[WERRNZKHUHVWXGHQWVFDQOHDUQWKHQDPHVRIYLVLEOHWKLQJVLQWKHLURZQODQJXDJH
as well as Latin, the imagery and poetry of The Ten Bulls demands an interpretive act in a more explicit 
way. As spiritual analogies and metaphors often do, the text forces the reader to pay attention to the 
hermeneutic conditions of living and of learning. The reader has to consider how the text is to be read. I 
suggest that the invisible is visible in the visible in a radical way. The paradoxical nature of the invisible 
being visible might even suggest that there is no invisible: that what you have in The Ten Bulls is 
unrepresentable. 
The concern of this paper has been to develop some implications that arise from 0ROOHQKDXHU¶V
ideas around pedagogical representation and reduction. The tentative hypothesis has been around the 
category of the unrepresentable which religious traditions generally have particular interest it. I have only 
begun the task of developing a systematic conception of pedagogical reduction in light of traditions that 
deny or complicate the idea of representation and reduction. Further questions could be developed about 
whether the unrepresentable is a coherent category at all, or whether the representational reduction is 
essential to education. The two texts discussed are oriented to representation from different ends. On the 
one hand, Orbis offers an apparently straightforward representation of the world, though, though raising 
significant difficulties when it comes to drawing a line between what is visible/invisible. On the other 
hand, the context of the Ten Bulls suggests a greater emphasis on the hermeneutical condition. The truth 
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